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Abstract  
Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in February 2008, but substantial proportions of its 
population are expressing their lack of confidence by preparing to emigrate. In this paper we present 
evidence from a customized post-independence survey (1367 face-to face interviews) on emigration 
intentions in Kosovo, carried out in June 2008. 30 % of the Albanian-speaking-majority respondents 
have taken concrete steps to move abroad, and emigration intentions have again risen to their pre-
independence peak. Strikingly, it is the better educated and those with higher incomes that are more 
likely to exit. Ethnic Serbs (the largest minority group) are less likely to emigrate than Kosovo’s ethnic 
majority.  
 
JEL classification: F22, J15, J61 
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4.  Conclusions Non-Technical Summary  
Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in February 2008, inheriting the youngest and the fastest 
growing population in Europe. Does this newly won independence give citizen optimism and a 
commitment to nation-building, or do the persisting fragilities in both the economic and political sphere 
elicit pessimism and induce people to vote with their feet? In a region, where outmigration was often 
synonymous with escape from a war zone, the motivations of current emigration intentions in calmer 
political circumstances are of special interest. We commissioned a survey of emigration intentions in 
Kosovo (1367 face-to face interviews), carried out in June 2008, which may well be the first survey of its 
kind since independence. In order to mitigate the common critique of migration intentions surveys, i.e. that 
intentions are a far cry from actual migration, we augment the likelihood of capturing actual future 
migration by inquiring about concrete steps taken to realize the emigration intentions.  
Our findings point to a substantial emigration potential from Kosovo. Around 30 % of the Albanian majority 
respondents report having taken concrete steps to pursue their intention to move abroad – and for longer 
periods of time. Germany, Switzerland and the US are preferred emigration destinations. For ethnic Serbs 
return migration to Serbia matters. Among the ethnic Albanian majority, males, those aged around 30, the 
single, the better educated,  the students, those with higher incomes, those with family connections 
abroad, and the second generation migrants are the most likely to emigrate. The ethnic Serbs, especially 
those living in the North and Centre enclaves, have considerably lower emigration propensity than the 
ethnic Albanians.  
This paper contributes to what we know about the Kosovo migration scene in the following ways: First, it 
is based on what may very well be the first detailed survey of emigration intentions from Kosovo after 
independence, and informs about size and characteristics of expected/potential future out-migration flows. 
Second, it provides an in-depth analysis of emigration intentions of the country’s Albanian speaking 
majority as well as of its largest – ethnic Serb – minority.  Third, using evidence from surveys carried out 




Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in February 2008. In a region, where 
outmigration was often synonymous with escape from a war zone, the motivations of 
current emigration intentions in calmer political circumstances are of special interest. Is 
emigration motivated by economic, political or, given the sizeable diasporas, personal 
reasons? Which population segments are the most likely to emigrate – and why? Has 
emigration potential changed after independence? 
 
Although the declaration of independence
1 in itself can be viewed as a celebratory event, 
exuding confidence that comes with self-determination, one word that comes to mind 
when thinking of Kosovo is ‘fragile’. Kosovo is still in need of a peace-keeping mission. 
Serious fragilities persist in the economy. With an unemployment rate of around 40%, 
with 15% of the population living ‘in extreme poverty’ and 45% living ‘in poverty’ 
(World Bank, 2007), conditions favor emigration for economic reasons.
2 In addition, 
Kosovo is known to have Europe’s youngest and fastest growing population. While this, 
in principle, holds the potential for energetic nation-building, it also holds the potential 
for emigration in search of better fortunes. Finally, Kosovo hosts non-negligible 
populations of ethnic minorities which, for different reasons, may have particularly high 
or particularly low propensities to migrate.  
 
This paper contributes to what we know about the Kosovo migration scene in the 
following ways: First, it is based on what may very well be the first detailed survey of 
emigration intentions from Kosovo after independence, and informs about size and 
characteristics of expected/potential future out-migration flows. Second, it provides an in-
depth analysis of emigration intentions of the country’s Albanian speaking majority as 
well as of its largest – ethnic Serb – minority.  Third, using evidence from surveys carried 
                                                 
1 Kosovo’s minority ethnic Serbs, backed by Serbia and its traditional Russian ally, have been opposing the 
secession and refer to it as a breach of international law. This dispute is under review by the International 
Court of Justice (Smith 2009).  
2 One positive development to report is that on June 29, 2009 Kosovo joined the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank. On the political front this may lead additional countries to recognize the state of 
Kosovo. On the economic front it is expected that this will bring external funding for infrastructure 
projects, which will improve conditions for economic recovery and encourage job creation. However, 
macroeconomic stability is currently not yet within reach and is likely to be delayed due to the global 
economic downturn (Smith 2009).  
  1out before February 2008, it compares emigration potential of Kosovars before and after 
independence.   
 
Our empirical analysis is based on the interview survey that we designed and 
commissioned four months after Kosovo proclaimed independence. It consists of 1367 
face-to-face interviews, and was carried out in June 2008. To gauge the seriousness of 
reported emigration intentions, and in recognition of the common critique of intentions 
surveys, we probe for concrete steps taken toward emigration. 
 
Our findings point to a substantial emigration potential from Kosovo. Around 
30 % of the Albanian majority respondents report having taken concrete steps to pursue 
their intention to move abroad – and for longer periods of time. Germany, Switzerland 
and the US are preferred emigration destinations. For ethnic Serbs return migration to 
Serbia matters. Among the ethnic Albanian majority, males, those aged around 30, the 
single, the better educated,  the students, those with higher incomes, those with family 
connections abroad, and the second generation migrants are the most likely to emigrate. 
The ethnic Serbs, especially those living in the North and Centre enclaves, have 
considerably lower emigration propensity than the ethnic Albanians.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two describes the data, 
presents descriptive statistics, and compares pre- and post-independence emigration 
potentials. Section three outlines the empirical model and reports regression results. 
Section four concludes.  
 
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics  
2.1. Description of the data  
 
We designed and commissioned an interview-survey of emigration intentions in Kosovo, 
carried out in June 2008 by the Strategic Marketing and Media Research Institute (based 
in Belgrade, Serbia). Of the 1367 interviews with Kosovars aged 18 - 86 :  845 were with 
people who identify themselves as ethnic Albanians, 482 with people who identify 
themselves as ethnic Serbs and 40 with people who identify themselves as other ethnic 
minorities (Turkish, Bosnian, Ashkali and Roma). The ethnic Albanian and Serb sub-
  2samples are representative insofar as they replicate the age, gender and geographic 
distributions of the general population. The Serb sub-sample was boosted (does not 
reflect the actual share of the ethnic Serbs in Kosovo’s population - about 6%) to get 
more insights about emigration intentions of this minority group. A detailed description 
of survey design and implementation is provided in appendix 1.  
 
The Questionnaire addressed a variety of issues including external migration, internal 
migration and remittances. The focus of this paper is on external migration, which we 
access by proxy: migration intentions. While the general use of emigration intentions data 
as a proxy for actual emigration is not uncontested,
3 emigration intentions have been 
shown to be a good predictor of future actual emigration (van Dalen and Henkens, 2008). 
Burda et al. (1998) take the stance that intentions are a monotonic function of the 
variables which motivate migration.
4 In addition, sending-country intentions data have 
certain advantages in determining the characteristics of future migrants, compared to the 
receiving country data on actual immigrants (Sousa-Poza (2004), van Dalen and Henkens 
(2008)).  Sending-country data are typically representative of the general population, 
while the receiving-country immigrant samples may be biased, e.g. when a particular host 
country aims at admitting only qualified migrants according to specific criteria.  
 
Respondents’ probability of emigration derives from their answers to the following 
sequence of questions: “How high is the probability that you will go to work and live 
outside of Kosovo within the next year?” - with a pre-set list of answers: “very low”, 
“rather low”, “rather high” and “very high”.  In order to mitigate the common critique of 
migration intentions surveys, i.e. that intentions are a far cry from actual migration, we 
augment the likelihood of capturing actual future migration by inquiring about concrete 
steps taken to realize the emigration intentions. In particular, those respondents who said 
that their probability of emigration is “rather high” or “very high” were asked a second 
question:  “What have you done to pursue your intention to move outside of Kosovo?” - 
without a pre-set list of answers. 
 
                                                 
3 See e.g. Manski (1990) for a critical evaluation of the relation between stated intentions and actual 
behaviour. 
4 For papers which empirically study emigration intentions see e.g. Burda et al. (1998), Drinkwater and 
Ingram (2008), Epstein and Gang (2006), Fidrmuc and Huber (2007), Lam (2000), Liebig and Sousa-Poza 
(2004), Papapanagos and Sanfey (2001) and Ubelmesser (2006).  
 
  3Combining the first and the second questions, we are able to determine the socio-
demographic profiles of three groups of people: 1) those with very low or rather low 
probabilities of emigration (we will call them stayers); 2) those with rather high or very 
high probabilities of emigration but having done nothing to realize their intention 
(dreamers); and 3) those with rather high or very high probabilities of emigration having 
taken concrete steps to realize their intentions of emigration (potential movers).  
 
In the following we will call ‘Kosovo Albanians’ the respondents who identify 
themselves as ethnic Albanians and speak Albanian as primary language with their family 
members. Similarly, we will call ‘Kosovo Serbs’ the respondents who identify themselves 
as ethnic Serbs and speak Serb with their family members.
5 ‘The non-Serb minorities’ 
will be the respondents who have identified themselves as ethnic Turks, Bosniaks, 
Ashkali or Roma, and speak Albanian, Serb or other language with their family members. 
Because of the low sample size, we view the results concerning the ‘the non-Serb 
minorities’ group with caution.  
 




2.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
The upper block of table 1 presents the self-reported likelihood of emigration for different 
ethnic groups, by gender.  Three things emerge: 1) emigration potential is enormous (29 
% of the Kosovo Albanians say that they are very likely to emigrate); 2) females seem to 
be less likely to migrate; 3) the Kosovo Serbs tend to report lower likelihood of 
emigration than the Kosovo Albanians, while the non-Serb minorities have likelihood of 





                                                 
5 To identify the ethnic identity of the respondents as precisely as possible, two questions - about ethnicity 
and the primary language spoken with family members – were included in the questionnaire.  
  4Table 1. Self-reported likelihood of emigration and concrete steps to emigrate, by 
ethnicity and gender.  
 




  All  Male   Females  All   Males  Females  All   Males  Females 
Self-reported 
likelihood of 
emigration         
    
     Very low  40%  32%  49%  66%  69%  74%  49%  42%  62% 
     Rather low  10%  8%  12%  8%  8%  7%  5%  8%  0% 
     Rather high  19%  21%  17%  9%  8%  10%  5%  4%  8% 
     Very high  29% 37% 20%  16% 23% 8%  41% 46% 31% 
             
Taken  concrete steps 
to emigrate  31% 44% 18%  8.2%  11.4%  4.5%  30% 33% 23% 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SMMRI survey data. 
 
 
The respondents who said that their probability of emigration was very high or rather 
high were subsequently asked whether they have done something (up to three answers) to 
pursue their emigration objectives. Out of these respondents, 40.7% said they have done 
nothing, 43.9% said they have collected information about the opportunities for work 
abroad, 36.3% said that they have contacted their relatives and friends abroad, and 5.6% 
said that they have also done one of the following: talked to the potential employer 
abroad, received a jobs offer from abroad, bought or booked travel ticket, received a work 
permit or concluded an agreement with an agency.  
 
The lower row of table 1 reports the proportions (out of the total respondents) who have 
taken concrete steps to realize their intention of moving abroad. It confirms the high 
potential of out-migration from Kosovo. More than 30 % of Kosovo Albanians have done 
something concrete in order to pursue their intention of moving abroad. The share is 
particularly high for the Kosovo-Albanian males (44%). While such an emigration 
potential may appear huge, it is not unusual: it is estimated that the number of migrants is 
equal to one quarter of the total population in the neighboring Albania (Piracha and 
Vadean 2009).  
 
Concerning preferred destination of the respondents (each respondent could give up to 
three answers), half (49.6%) of the Kosovo Albanians with very high or rather high 
probability of emigration reported Germany as their preferred emigration destination. The 
  5next on the list are Switzerland and the USA (both 34%), the UK (29%), France (18.2%), 
Italy (16.4%) and Sweden (15.2%). The preferred destinations for the Kosovo Serbs are 
Serbia (29.7%) and Switzerland (21.6%), followed by the USA, Norway, Greece, Italy, 
Luxemburg, Slovenia and Montenegro with a score between 4 and 6%.  For both groups, 
Switzerland is an important destination, reflecting previous refugee networks (ESI 
(2006)). For the same reason, Germany is the most important destination among the 
Kosovo Albanians.  
 
With regard to the reasons behind emigration intentions, 52.5 % of the respondents 
mention the impossibility of finding work in Kosovo as the main reason for emigrating, 
25.7 % a chance to earn more money, and 9.7% better career and growth opportunities. 
While the given reasons are, in general, not unusual, the high proportion of respondents 
listing the lack of work opportunities in Kosovo points to the fragile state of the economy, 
in particular the unemployment rate, which, as already mentioned, is listed at around 
40%. 
 
The answers to the question: “If you go outside of Kosovo for work, for how long do you 
think you would stay?” reveal that longer stays are definitely preferred to shorter ones.  
35% of respondents with rather high or very high likelihood to migrate want to leave 
forever, 15% for longer than 5 years, 18.6% for 3-5 years, 5.7% for 1-3 years and 4.7% 
for up to 1 year. These results remain roughly the same when we restrict the group of 
respondents to those having taken concrete steps to pursue their intention to emigrate.  
 
 
2.3 Emigration potential before and after independence 
 
Before moving to the econometric analysis of the micro-determinants of emigration 
decision, we take a look at what happened to the overall migration potential in Kosovo as 
it gained independence.  Intuitively, independence should be associated with more 
stability, new opportunities and increased abilities to decide one’s own policy and 
influence economic and political processes – all in all an optimistic scenario, making 
people more willing to stay at home.  But are residents really considering Kosovo to be a 
viable state? After all, not all countries have formally recognized Kosovo as an 
  6independent state. Kosovo’s economy remains fragile and the current worldwide 
recession has rendered the prospects for improvement questionable in the immediate 
future. Would it then make people more likely to leave? 
 
We do not know what the likelihood of emigration of our respondents was before Kosovo 
proclaimed independence. However, we can compare the results of our post-
independence survey to the estimates of emigration potential from surveys conducted 
before February 2008.
6 One such source is the regular Early Warning Reports (EWR) 
prepared by the United Nations Development Mission in Kosovo. The reports rely on 
continuous and nationally representative opinion poll surveys, providing insight into 
issues potentially affecting the economic, political, and social stability of Kosovo.  
 
The pre-independence EWR surveys carried out in December 2005, September 2006, 
March 2007 and October 2007 included a question on the intention to migrate from 
Kosovo, with possible answers “yes” or “no”.
7 The results for the Kosovo Albanians, the 
Kosovo Serbs and the non-Serb minorities are reported in graph 1. The rightmost point of 
each of the three lines represents the evidence from our own survey, carried out in June 
2008. For  reasons of comparability, we remove the upper age limit from our sample and 
represent the intention to emigrate by the sum of the percentages for a ‘very high’ and a 
‘rather high’ likelihood of emigration.  
 
Graph 1 conveys a peak of 40% of Kosovo Albanians expressing their intention to 
emigrate in March of 2007. But then in October of 2007 as we are approaching the date 
of declaration of independence (i.e. February 2008) the percentage of emigration seekers 
is cut in half - only 20% of Albanian speakers express an intention to emigrate. This lends 
itself to the interpretation that the impending declaration of independence instilled 
optimism, or at least a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude into the population. Our post-independence 
survey of June 2008 suggests that this presumed optimism was frustrated and faded away: 
the proportion of Albanian speakers intending to emigrate jumped up to the pre-
independence peak of 40%. This is not a vote of confidence regarding the newly 
                                                 
6 Of course all the caveats concerning comparisons of observations originating in distinct datasets with 
different data collection methodologies apply here. 
7The survey reports are available at http://www.ks.undp.org/.  Not all EWR surveys contain a question on 
emigration intentions; in particular the (so far) only post-independence EWR survey (April 2009) did not 
contain a question on emigration intentions.  
  7established state – rather it is a distress signal. 
 











































































































































































































Source: EWR and SMMRI surveys.  
 
 
For Kosovo Serbs emigration potential peaks somewhat earlier, i.e. in the second half of 
2006 at around 33%; this is lower than that shown for the Kosovo Albanians and the non-
Serb minorities. By October 2007 the percentage reporting emigration intentions has 
declined to below 10% (half of the magnitude reported by Kosovo Albanians at the same 
date).  
 
The non-Serb minorities show a very different pattern from that of the Serb minority. As 
a matter of fact migration intentions of the non-Serb minorities run parallel to that of 
Kosovo Albanians (the ethnic majority). As the graph shows the non-Serb minorities 
display the highest percentage of migration intentions over the entire time interval under 
consideration. 
 
By way of comparison we can say that the magnitude of emigration seekers is stratified 
throughout the relevant time interval and is highest for the non-Serb minorities, second 
  8highest for the Kosovo Albanian majority, lowest for the Kosovo Serb minority. That 
emigration intentions are higher for the Kosovo Albanian majority than for the Serb 
minority is interesting in that it is counter- intuitive, and invites the possible interpretation 
that Kosovo Albanians’ pessimism about the newly independent state of Kosovo is 
echoed by the Kosovo Serbs’ expectation that this independent state may be a ‘temporary 
aberration’, a sentiment that has been expressed in various forms by Serbian groups when 
describing the ‘illegitimacy of Kosovo’s declaration of independence’.  
 
3. Empirical Results 
 
 3.1. Empirical specification 
The objective of this section is to determine the socio-demographic profile of the 
potential Kosovo migrant. Recall that the respondents were first asked whether their 
likelihood of emigration was very low, rather low, rather high or very high, and 
subsequently the respondents reporting rather high or very high likelihood of emigration 
were asked whether they had done something to realize their emigration intention. The 
two questions allow for two dependent variables. The first is ordinal taking values from 1 
to 4 if the respondent says that he or she is very unlikely (1), rather unlikely (2), rather 
likely (3) and very likely (4) to move abroad. The dependent variable of this type is 
standard in the emigration intentions literature (e.g. Papapanagos and Sanfey, 2001; 
Liebig and Sousa-Poza, 2004; Epstein and Gang, 2006), and a model explaining it is 
typically estimated with ordered probit or logit. The second dependent variable accounts 
for both the self-reported likelihood of emigration and specific action to realize 
emigration intentions. It is a discrete choice variable consisting of the three mutually 
exclusive states: 1) the individual has taken concrete action to realize his or her intention 
to move abroad (potential mover); 2) the individual reports rather high or very high 
likelihood of emigration but has done nothing to realize his emigration intention 
(dreamer); 3) the individual has rather low or very low likelihood of emigration (stayer). 
We estimate this discrete choice model with the multinomial probit
8 (see e.g. Wooldridge 
(2001)).  
                                                 
8 One alternative would be to estimate a multinomial logit model. However, contrary to the multinomial 
probit, multinomial logit relies on the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption, i.e. it does not 
  9The set of standard socio-demographic characteristics potentially affecting the propensity 
to migrate includes age and its quadratic term, household size and its quadratic term, 
household income per income earner and its quadratic term, dummies for eight education 
levels (including students), dummies for being male, married, having children of different 
age, living in rural area and being unemployed. In addition, the respondents were asked 
whether they have family members/relatives working abroad and whether these family 
members are sending remittances back home. Using this information we construct two 
dummy variables: first, for family members living abroad and sending remittances back 
home; second, for family members living abroad but not sending remittances. Finally, 
given the incidence of migration into Kosovo from Albania and Serbia in the recent past 
(see e.g. Malcolm, 1998), we want to account for the past migration histories in the 
family by including dummies for the first and second generation migrants. As shown by 
Ivlevs and King (2008), the host-country born children of former migrants have 
particularly high likelihood of emigration and we want to test this hypothesis in Kosovo. 
Definitions and summary statistics of all variables are provided in Appendix 2.  
In all our specifications we include dummies for the municipalities in which the 
respondents live (altogether 24 municipalities). We do this for two reasons. First, it 
allows to us to fully isolate the effects of individual characteristics variables from the 
combined municipality level effect on individual decision to emigrate. Second, the poor 
quality or unavailability of data on regional-level variables that potentially affect 
emigration decision (e.g., the unemployment, crime, ethnic diversity, population density 
rates) leaves us with no other choice as to use municipality fixed effects.  
Finally, we impose on our sample an age limit of 64 years, and we exclude from the 
sample pupils (12 respondents) and the respondents who say that they are normally 
working abroad and at the moment of interviews are in Kosovo for holidays (5 
respondents).  
 
                                                                                                                                                  
account for the similarities among alternatives in the individual’s choice set. Another alternative would be 
to estimate a probit model with Heckman selection where in the first stage the respondents are selected into 
reporting ‘rather high’ or ‘very high’ willingness to emigrate, and in the second stage decide to take or not 
specific action in order to emigrate. The disadvantage of this approach is that the set of explanatory 
variables in the first (selection) and second stage equations must be different (Baum 2006); we would 
therefore have to make a strict assumption that some factors affecting the selection into rather high or very 
high likelihood of emigration do not affect the selection into taking concrete steps towards emigration.   
  103.2. Results  
 
In the first part of this sub-section we econometrically analyze the determinants of 
emigration decision of Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. We are first looking at the 
Kosovo-Albanian sample, as they constitute an overwhelming majority of the population 
(88%) and allow us to make predictions about emigration intentions from Kosovo in 
general. Emigration intentions of the Kosovo-Serb minority are also of interest to us, as 
they are one of the many examples of the newly-formed ethnic minorities in Central and 
Eastern Europe. While the small sample size of the non-Serb minorities does not allow us 
to run separate regressions on this group, at the end of this sub-section we comment on 
partial effects of different ethnic dummies in a pooled regression.  
 
 
Kosovo Albanians  
Table 2 shows the results of the estimated self-reported likelihood to emigrate model 
(Model 1, left panel) and Stayer/ Dreamer/ Mover model (Model 2, right panel) for the 
Kosovo Albanians. For space saving purposes we only report the marginal effects of the 
individual-level regressors, indicating the statistically significant coefficients.
9  
 
The ordered probit results (Model 1) suggest that, other factors held constant, males, 
students, respondents with a university degree and relatives abroad are less likely to 
report ‘very low’ willingness to migrate and  more likely to report ‘rather high’ or ‘very 
high’ willingness to migrate. The relationship between age and the ‘very high’ self-
reported likelihood to migrate is of an inverted U-shape, with the inflection point 
occurring at 25 years. These findings can be easily explained: Higher likelihood of 
migration of the relatively young people supports the predictions of the individual life-
time utility maximizing migration model (Sjaasted 1962). Males want to migrate more 
because of the primacy of the construction sector in the actual employment of Kosovo 
migrants abroad (Riinvest Institute 2007). Networks – one of the most important 
migration drivers (Beine et al. 2009, Massey et al. 2005) - increase the willingness to 
migrate through lower migration costs and the desire to re-unite with one’s family.   
Finally, respondents with higher levels of education are more efficient in overcoming the 
                                                 
9 Complete regression output is available from the authors upon request. (For referees – see appendix not 
submitted for publication) 
  11administrative, linguistic and job search costs associated with the migratory move.  
 
These results largely survive if the specific action undertaken to realize one’s emigration 
intentions is taken into account (Model 2). In particular, we find that, holding other 
factors constant, males are 30 percentage points more likely to be potential movers and 27 
percentage points less likely to be stayers; respondents with relatives abroad are 32-35 
percentage points more likely to be potential movers and 22-23 percentage points less 
likely to be stayers; respondents with university degree are 20 percentage points more 
likely to be potential movers; and students are 32 percentage points less likely to be 
stayers and 17 percentage points more likely to be dreamers. 
 
 With reference to earlier waves of emigration from Kosovo we note a distinct shift from 
the mostly low skilled labor of earlier emigrants (Riinvest 2007, ESI 2006) to the higher 
skill and higher education level of the people reporting emigration intentions now. In 
combination with the reported intentions by a significant proportion of migration seekers 
to leave Kosovo permanently and/or for a long time this is suggestive of a pessimistic 
outlook on the future of this very new state. It also suggests that the negative effects, i.e. 
brain drain, are likely to outweigh any positive effect from the current prospective wave 
of outmigration. 
 
Next,  we find that the single are 23 percentage points more likely, and the respondents 
with children under 6 years old 11 percentage points more likely, to be potential movers. 
This again invites the interpretation of pervasive pessimism. While singles, generally are 
among the more mobile, respondents with very young children may be moving because 
they fail to see a good future for their children in Kosovo.  
 
The stayer/ dreamer/ potential mover model reveals an important role of income in taking 
specific steps towards emigration. The coefficients of household income per earner and 
its quadratic term are statistically significant, suggesting an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between income and moving abroad. The probability of being a potential 
mover first increases with income up to the level of 318 EUR per earner, and decreases 
thereafter. However, the income per earner of 88 % of the Kosovo-Albanian respondents 
is lower than 318 EUR, meaning that for the vast majority of ethnic Albanians the 
probability of emigration increases with income. This finding could be an indication of 
  12the loss of the energetic, talented and entrepreneurial people from Kosovo. It also 
suggests that migration costs are important for the decision to migrate, and, in Kosovo, 
only the relatively wealthy are able to cover them.  
 
The results also suggest that the unemployed and the respondents from rural areas are less 
likely to be stayers. Interestingly, being second generation migrant increases the 
probability of moving by 18 percentage points and decreases the probability of staying by 
23 percentage points. This finding is in congruence with results we obtained from similar 
interview data in Latvia (Ivlevs and King 2008). The intuition behind this latter result is 
that the children of migrants have heard stories about their parents’ successful migration 
in the past and have learned from their parents a positive attitude toward migration. Such 
children may also gain experience, early on, about crossing borders and experiencing 
different cultures, based on visits to family members on the other side of the border. Thus 
the children of migrants have less psychic costs associated with migration. 
 
Finally, the probability of taking specific action towards emigration peaks at 32 years; 
recall that it was 25 years – a substantial difference – for reporting ‘very high’ likelihood 
of emigration. One possible explanation for this discrepancy in ‘peak age’ may be that 
insufficient income prevents the younger people to take concrete actions to realize their 
emigration intentions.  
  13Table 2. Covariates of the self-reported willingness to emigrate, Kosovo Albanians, 
ordered and multinomial probit marginal effects (N=627).  
 
  Model 1: Self-reported likelihood of emigration, 
Ordered probit 
Model 2: Stayer/dreamer/mover 
Multinomial probit 







high  Stayer Dreamer  Mover 
 
Age  -0.024* 0.000  0.007  0.017*  -0.060***  0.019  0.042*** 
Age
2/100  0.048*** 0.001  -0.015***  -0.034***  0.099*** -0.034** -0.066*** 
Male  -0.190*** -0.003  0.057***  0.137***  -0.269*** -0.031  0.301*** 
Single  -0.004 0.000 0.001  0.003  -0.122 -0.104*  0.226** 
Children under 6  -0.073 -0.001  0.022  0.051  -0.084 -0.025 0.109** 
Children aged 7-14  0.022  0.000 -0.007 -0.016 0.052  -0.011 -0.042 
Children aged 15-18  0.012  0.000 -0.004 -0.009 0.025  -0.033 0.008 
Household size  -0.046  -0.001  0.014 0.033 -0.037  0.051 -0.014 
Household size
2
0.004*  0.000  -0.001  -0.003* 0.004  -0.004* 0.000 
Education  
(ref.: finished secondary)          
Elementary   -0.019 0.000 0.006  0.014  0.114  -0.040 -0.075 
Non-completed secondary   -0.038 -0.001  0.011  0.028  -0.031 -0.009 0.041 
Secondary vocational   0.006 0.000  -0.002  -0.004  -0.095  0.064 0.031 
Currently a student  -0.170** -0.015  0.038*** 0.147**  -0.319***  0.172*  0.147 
Some faculty   -0.057  -0.003  0.016 0.044 -0.022  0.018 0.003 
Completed college   -0.002  0.000 0.001 0.002 0.073 0.055 -0.128 
Completed faculty   -0.150** -0.013  0.034*** 0.129*  -0.158  -0.046  0.204** 
Income/100  -0.056 -0.001  0.017  0.040  -0.123**  -0.017 0.140*** 
Income
2/10000  0.010* 0.000  -0.003*  -0.007*  0.021***  0.001  -0.022*** 
Unemployed  -0.093*  -0.004  0.025*  0.072 -0.174**  0.080 0.094 
Living in rural area  -0.065  -0.001  0.020 0.046 -0.090*  0.034 0.056 
Networks + remittances  -0.165*** -0.004  0.048***  0.121***  -0.218*** -0.135*** 0.353*** 
Networks, no remittances  -0.206*** -0.020**  0.044***  0.182***  -0.227*** -0.091*** 0.318*** 
1
st generation migrant  -0.159  -0.017  0.032**  0.145 -0.155  0.291 -0.136 
2
nd generation migrant  -0.167*** -0.016  0.036***  0.148**  -0.225**  0.047  0.177** 
          
 
Notes 1)  *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  2) Robust standard errors (not reported) used to calculate regressors’ level of significance. 
  3) The regressions, on which the marginal effects are based, include municipality fixed effects. 
Their coefficients are not reported. 
 
  14 Kosovo Serbs 
We run analogous regressions for the Kosovo Serbs. There are, however, several nuances 
worth mentioning. First, given that geographically the ethnic Serb are concentrated in a 
few municipalities (in the so called Serb enclaves) in the centre, north and south-east 
regions of Kosovo, we include two dummies for the centre-north (reference) and the 
south-east regions.
10 Second, given that only a few Serb respondents reported having 
unfinished secondary, secondary vocational education and higher non-completed 
education, we create four educational dummies: less than finished secondary education 
(elementary, unfinished secondary and secondary vocational); finished secondary; less 
that university degree (unfinished faculty and finished college); and finished faculty.  
 
The left panel of table 3 reports the results of the self-reported likelihood to migrate 
model for the Kosovo Serbs. We find that, other things equal, males, the single, people 
with young children and networks abroad, the respondents living in rural areas and 
Southeast Kosovo, and the former migrants are more likely to report ‘rather high’ or ‘very 
high’ willingness to migrate and less likely to report ‘very low’ willingness to migrate.   
 
As far as the concrete steps towards emigration are concerned (Model 2, centre panel of 
table 3), males, respondents with networks and especially those living in South-East 
Kosovo appear to be more likely to be potential movers. The single, the respondents from 
rural areas and those with connections abroad (but not receiving remittances) are more 
likely to be dreamers.  
 
Next, we want to see whether the characteristics of potential migrants differ depending on 
the preferred destination. Serbia is the preferred destination for 28% of the Serbian 
speaking respondents with very high or rather high self-reported probability to emigrate, 
probably reflecting the intention to return to Serbia. Therefore, we want to determine the 
characteristics of 1) the potential return migrants, 2) international migrants (who want to 
migrate to a country other than Serbia) and 3) those who do not want to migrate from 
Kosovo (stayers). The estimates of the resulting multinomial probit model are reported in 
the right panel of 3 (Model 3). They suggest that the first generation migrants, people 
                                                 
10 Ideally, one should include the three regional dummies:  for 1) centre, 2) north and 3) south-east. 
However, none of the Kosovo Serb respondents living in the centre region reported taking specific action 
towards emigration. To assure the convergence of the model, the centre and the north regions were merged.  
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with networks abroad, and single people are particularly likely to choose Serbia as 
preferred migration destination. At the same time, the probability to become an 
international migrant is the highest for males, those in their late-30s (37 is the threshold 
age at which the probability of emigration peaks), respondents with networks, and those 
living in South-East Kosovo. The Kosovo Serbs with the lowest levels of education are 
more likely to stay in Kosovo and less likely to consider international migration.  
 
Importantly, the ethnic Serbs living in the South-Eastern enclaves of Kosovo (in contrast 
to those living in the northern and central enclaves) emerge as particularly strong 
candidates for emigration. Looking closer we find that municipalities in the south-east of 
Kosovo suffer from particularly serious economic deprivation.
11 Also due to the 
geographic location, i.e. at a greater distance from Serbia than the northern enclaves, 
Serbs living here are quite isolated from Serb influence (see e.g. Binnendijk et al (2006)): 
while the prospect of annexation of the northern Kosovo Serb enclaves is kept alive by 
Serbian authorities, such prospect is viewed as very remote for the case of the south-
eastern Kosovo enclaves.  
 
11 For example the 2005 and 2007 World Bank Reports Kosovo Poverty Assessment list the south-eastern 
region Ferizaji as the region with the highest percentage of residents living in extreme poverty and the 
highest unemployment rate. From our survey we find that the proportion of Kosovo Serb respondents 
declaring that they are unemployed is indeed the highest in the South-East Kosovo (66%), followed by the 
North (24%) and the Centre (16%). For same indicator for the Kosovo Albanians is 32% in the South-East, 
28% in the North, 25 % in the South-West, 24% in the Centre, and 21% in the North-West.   17
Table 3. Covariates of the self-reported likelihood of emigration, Kosovo Serbs, ordered and multinomial probit marginal effects (N=354) 
 
  Model 1: Self-reported likelihood of emigration, 
Ordered probit 
Model 2: Stayer/dreamer/mover 
Multinomial probit 
Model 3: Likelihood of migration by 
destination,  multinomial probit 
 
Very low  Rather 
low 
Rather 











Age  -0.018  0.004  0.006  0.008 -0.031**  0.029**  0.001 -0.027**  0.009 0.018* 
Age
2/100  0.019  -0.004 -0.006 -0.009  0.036**  -0.034**  -0.002 0.033**  -0.009 -0.024* 
Male  -0.153***  0.035*** 0.047*** 0.071***  -0.083**  0.043  0.040**  -0.085**  0.033  0.053* 
Single  -0.154*  0.033* 0.047* 0.074*  -0.188***  0.178***  0.010  -0.174***  0.164***  0.010 
Children  under  6  -0.160*  0.031**  0.047*  0.082*  -0.093  0.089 0.004 -0.097  0.035 0.062 
Children  aged  7-14  0.043 -0.010  -0.013  -0.019 0.034  -0.010 -0.024 0.037  0.005  -0.042 
Children  aged  15-18  -0.097  0.020 0.030 0.047  -0.090 0.105*  -0.015 -0.075 -0.007 0.082 
Household  size  0.024  -0.005 -0.007 -0.011  -0.009  0.018  -0.008  -0.010  0.023  -0.013 
Household size
2 -0.002  0.001 0.001 0.001  0.000  -0.001 0.001  0.000  -0.001 0.001 
Education  
(ref.: completed secondary)               
Less than compl. sec.   0.172**  -0.049*  -0.056**  -0.067***  0.083  -0.071 -0.012 0.088* -0.005 -0.083*** 
Student  0.026 -0.006  -0.008  -0.012 -0.004 0.014  -0.010 -0.013 -0.021 0.034 
Some  faculty/college  -0.178*  0.030**  0.050*  0.097 -0.091  0.075 0.016 -0.081  0.045 0.036 
Completed  faculty   0.054 -0.013  -0.017  -0.024 0.037  -0.033 -0.004 0.024  -0.045*  0.021 
Income/100  0.012  -0.003 -0.004 -0.005  0.026  -0.053*  0.027  0.015  0.003  -0.018 
Incomer
2/10000  -0.001  0.000 0.000 0.000  -0.002 0.006*  -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.003 
Unemployed  -0.028  0.006 0.009 0.013  -0.017 -0.018 0.035  -0.032 -0.015 0.047 
Living in rural area  -0.107*  0.025*  0.034*  0.048**  -0.057  0.087**  -0.030  -0.047  0.028  0.019 
Networks + remittances  -0.072  0.015  0.022  0.035  -0.173*  0.016  0.157**  -0.199**  0.141**  0.058 
Networks,  no  remittances  -0.220***  0.043*** 0.065*** 0.112***  -0.192*** 0.117**  0.076*  -0.189*** 0.069**  0.120*** 
1
st  generation  migrant  -0.289** 0.037*** 0.074*** 0.177*  -0.208*  0.191  0.018  -0.169*  0.198**  -0.029 
2
nd  generation  migrant  -0.150  0.027  0.043  0.080 -0.071  0.083 -0.012  -0.057  0.049 0.008 
South  East  Kosovo  -0.460***  0.045*** 0.105*** 0.310***  -0.401*** 0.184**  0.217***  -0.403*** -0.030  0.433*** 
 
Notes 1)  *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  2)  Robust standard errors used to calculate regressors’ level of significance. 
 
 Comparing emigration potential of respondents of different ethnicities.  
 
 
Finally, we want to compare whether ethnically different respondents under otherwise 
similar circumstances have different propensities to emigrate. Ethnic minorities in 
Kosovo, especially the non-Serb ones, are likely to suffer from marginalization and 
discrimination. A recent very critical report (Stevens 2009) published by Minority Rights 
Group International (MRG) points to an exodus of members of minority communities 
from Kosovo and concludes that Kosovo "lacks effective international protection for 
minorities, which is worsening the situation for smaller minorities and forcing some to 
leave the country for good".  
 
Our descriptive statistics suggest that the non-Serb minorities have emigration propensity 
comparable to or higher than that of the Kosovo Albanians, and the likelihood of 
emigration of the Serb minority appears considerably lower. To shed more light on this 
issue, we run pooled regressions which include the following ethnic dummies: 1) ethnic 
Albanians (the reference group); 2) ethnic Serbs from the South-East Kosovo enclaves; 3) 
ethnic Serbs from the Central and Northern enclaves; and 4) other ethnic minorities. The 
reason to distinguish between the two ethnic Serb groups is the noticeably higher self-
reported likelihood to migrate of Serbs living in South-East Kosovo, as already 
mentioned above.  The pooled regressions control for the same individual-level 
characteristics as in table 2. However, instead of 24 small municipality dummies we 
include 5 bigger district dummies. We do so to prevent the municipalities from capturing 
the ethnicity effect, as there may be a high concentration of the ethnic minorities in 
particular municipalities. The data are weighted to make the sample ethnically 
representative. 
 
Table 4 reports the marginal effects of the variables of interest.
12 Compared to the 
Kosovo Albanians and keeping other factors constant, the Serbs from central and northern 
Kosovo are significantly less likely to emigrate. The Serbs from the south-east enclaves 
do not differ from the Kosovo Albanians in the self-reported likelihood of migration; 
however, they are less likely than the Kosovo Albanians to have taken concrete steps 
                                                 
12 Complete regression results are available from the authors upon request.  
  18towards emigration. Finally, emigration propensity of the non-Serb minorities does not 
differ from that of the Kosovo Albanians.  
 
Suggested reasons that explain the lower willingness to migrate of the Kosovo Serbs, 
especially those living in the Central and Northern part of the country include the 
influence and proximity of Serbia, the conjecture that those who wanted to migrate have 
already done so, and the perception (encouraged by Serbian authorities) that Kosovo is ‘a 
Serb land’.  
 
 
  19Table 4. Covariates of the likelihood to migrate, pooled sample, ordered and 
multinomial probit marginal effects (N=1025).  
 
  Model 1: Self-reported likelihood of emigration, 
Ordered probit 
Model 2: Stayer/dreamer/mover 
Multinomial probit 








Stayer Dreamer  Mover 
 
Ethnicity (reference: Albanian)            
     Serbs – South-East Kosovo  0.007  0.000  -0.002  -0.005  0.056  0.067  -0.123** 
     Serbs – Centre and North Kosovo  0.339***  -0.043*** -0.115*** -0.180***  0.286***  -0.069**  -0.218*** 
     The non-Serb minorities  0.033  -0.001  -0.008  -0.023  0.006  -0.034  0.028 
          
 
 
Notes:    
1) The two regressions include five district dummies and the same individual-level variables as in table 2. 
Their coefficients are not reported.  
2) *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01   






Kosovo’s recent declaration of independence lends itself to an examination of the 
population’s emigration propensity ‘before’ and ‘after’. While one intuitively might 
associate optimism with the creation of an independent state – at least for the ethnic 
majority- our findings point in the opposite direction. Post-independence emigration 
intentions of the Albanian speaking majority return to their pre-independence peak - 
hardly a vote of confidence for the new state of Kosovo. Similar conclusions hold for the 
country’s Serb speaking minority as well as for the non-Serb minorities. 
 
A further striking and worrisome finding is that the better educated and wealthier are 
more likely to emigrate and many intend to move away forever – which again lends itself 
to be understood as an expression of deep pessimism with adverse consequences for the 
development prospects of the new state. 
 
Counter-intuitively we find the Serbian speaking minority less likely to emigrate than the 
Albanian speaking majority- possibly reflecting the fact that those among the Serbian 
speakers who wanted to move out have already done so. Another reason may be that 
  20among the Serbian speakers, and with the tacit encouragement of the Serbian authorities, 
Kosovo is perceived to remain a ‘Serb land’ and independent Kosovo (not yet recognized 
as such by all states) possibly a temporary aberration. It is interesting to note how 
geography matters. We find that the Serb respondents living in geographic proximity to 
Serbia (North and Centre of Kosovo) show a noticeably lower propensity for emigration 
compared to the enclaves in the south-eastern part of Kosovo. Here the reasons for high 
emigration intentions may be because of both economic and political reasons: Economic 
because of relatively deeper poverty and political because in this remote location the 
influence of the Serbian authorities is low and possible annexation by Serbia is highly 
unlikely – in contrast to the north-Kosovo enclaves, which border on Serbia. 
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Population of Kosovo 18+; Census figures 1981, estimated  results of Census 1991,  
estimated population dynamics, and census figures of refugees and IDPs from 2000, 
2002 and 2005. 
Sampling 
frame 
Polling stations territory (approximate size of census units) within strata defined by  
regions and type of settlements (urban and rural) 
Polling stations territories enables the most reliable sample selection, due to the fact 
that for these units the most complete data are available  
Type of 
sample 








PSU – Polling station territory 
Definition: Polling stations territories are defined by street(s) name(s) and dwelling 
numbers; each polling station territory comprises approximately 300 households, with 
exception of the settlements with less than 300 HH which are defined as one unite.  
Number of PSUs in sample universe: 920   
SSU - Household 
Definition: One household comprises people living in the same apartment and sharing 
the expenditure for food  
Number of SSUs in sample universe:  420 000. 
TSU – Respondent  
Definition: Member of the HH , 18+  
Number of TSUs in sample universe: 1,320 000 
Sampling points 
Approximately 10 sampling points per one PSU 
Sub sample  First level strata:  Second level strata:  
Ethnic Albanians   3 regions 
Ethnic Serbs  2 regions 






Purpose: Optimization of the sample plan, and reducing the sampling error 







PSU   Type of sampling of the PSU: Polling station territory chosen with probability 
proportional to size (PPS); method of selection: Cumulative (Lachirie method) 
SSU  Type of sampling of the SSU: Sample random sampling without replacement; 
method of selection: Random walk - Random choice of the starting point  
TSU – Respondent   Type of sampling of respondent: Sample random sampling 
without replacement; method of selection: Kish scheme 
Sample size 
1300 completed questionnaires (minimum) 
•  at least 800 residents age 18 and over among ethnic Albanians and  
•  at least 500 residents age 18 and over among ethnic Serbs  
Margin error: 2.78   Sampling 
error  Sub samples margin error: n=800  +/- 3.65; n=500 =/- 4,68 
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About Strategic Marketing 
 
The survey on was conducted by Strategic Marketing Research Centre - a private and 
independent research company whose major fields of activity include various types of 
marketing and public opinion research, based in Belgrade, Serbia. Strategic Marketing is 
part of SMMRI Group (Strategic Marketing and Media Research Institute Group), a 
network of research institutes which covers several countries: Serbia, Montenegro, 
Macedonia, Kosovo, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Strategic Marketing adheres to 
the standards of ISI (International Statistical Institute) and ESOMAR (European Society 
for Opinion and Marketing Research) concerning sample design, data collection and 
processing, and data analysis methods. The company began operating in 1997 and since 
then has become one of the leading and well-known research suppliers in the Central 





The survey expenses were covered from the Leverhulme Centre for Globalisation and 
Economic Policy (Nottingham School of Economics) and Østfold University College 
Småforsk grant 2008 research funds obtained for the implementation of this project. 







Variable   Definition  Mean St.d.  Mean St.d. 
        
Age  Age in years  37.14  13.93  34.70  13.33 
*Male  1 if male  0.507  0.500  0.535  0.499 
*Single  1 if single, 0 if lives with a partner, married or 
widowed  0.302  0.459  0.446  0.498 
*Children under 6  1 if has children under 7  0.559  0.497  0.225  0.418 
*Children aged 7-14  1 if has children 7-14  0.568  0.496  0.291  0.455 
*Children aged 15-18  1 if has children 15-18  0.373  0.484  0.239  0.427 
Household size  Number of household members  5.898  2.100  4.415  1.806 
Household income per earner   Household income per income earner, in EUR  196.2  125.2  277.1  172.8 
Education          
*Elementary  1 if elementary education or non-completed 
elementary education  0.120  0.325  -  - 
*Non-completed sec.  1 if non-completed secondary education  0.105  0.307  -  - 
*Secondary vocational  1 if secondary vocational education  0.063  0.243  -  - 
*Less than completed sec. 
(only Kosovo Serbs) 
1 if elementary, non-completed secondary or 
secondary vocational education   -  -  0.087  0.282 
*Completed secondary  1 if finished secondary education (excluding 
current students)  0.552  0.498  0.735  0.442 
*Currently a student  1 if a student  0.133  0.340  0.188  0.391 
*Some faculty   1 if non-completed higher education  0.044  0.205  -  - 
*Completed college   1 if completed college education  0.029  0.169  -  - 
*Some faculty/college 
(only Kosovo Serbs) 
1 if non-completed higher education or 
college education  -  -  0.094  0.292 
*Completed faculty   1 if completed higher education  0.086  0.281  0.085  0.278 
*Unemployed  1 if unemployed  0.202  0.402  0.223  0.417 
*Living in rural area  1 if lives in rural area  0.479  0.500  0.655  0.476 
*Networks + remittances  1 if has family members abroad who send 
money back home  0.454  0.498  0.127  0.333 
*Networks, no remittances  1 if has family members abroad who do not  
send money back home  0.158  0.365  0.308  0.462 
*1
st generation migrant  If born outside Kosovo  0.016  0.126  0.054  0.226 
*2
nd generation migrant 
If born in Kosovo, and at least one of the 
grandparents never lived in Kosovo (implying 
that parents migrated to Kosovo) 
0.079  0.270  0.231  0.056 
 
* indicates a dummy variable.  
 
  26